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Abstract 
We explore intertemporal decision making to test the extent to which elicited 
discount rates and a self-reported scale of impatience measure the same behavioral 
characteristic. We conduct experiments in which we elicit discount rates using 
monetary rewards and a self-reported measure of impatience (the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale, BIS-11). Although researchers have utilized these measures to 
infer aspects of intertemporal preferences, we find no significant correlation between 
discount rates and the BIS-11 except in the special case where discount rates were 
elicited after individuals were primed with negative feedback.   
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1  Introduction 
Intertemporal preferences are largely affected by individuals’ impulsiveness and 
impatience. As such, one may expect individuals’ impulsivity to affect the ways in 
which they make decisions involving delayed costs and benefits. Indeed, in the 
economic and psychological literature there is significant research on the ways in 
which impulsivity affects decisions involving trade-offs between present and future 
costs and benefits. For example, increased impulsivity has been associated with 
greater procrastination and reduced self-control (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001; 
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). As such, there is a strong and identifiable link between 
impulsivity and aggression (Stanford et al., 1995), sexual behavior (Clift et al., 1993), 
and risk taking (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2000; Stanford et al., 1996). In terms of 
socially and economically relevant behaviors, greater impatience affects the manner 
in which individuals plan for retirement (Banks et al., 1998; Laibson, 1997), invest in 
human capital (Thompson et al., 1983), engage in criminal behavior (Eysenck and 
McGurk, 1980), and make choices regarding their diets (Shapiro, 2005).3  
For psychologists and economists who study decision making, it is imperative 
that we identify the extent to which impulsiveness affects decision making. That is, 
only when we can properly gauge the impact of impulsiveness on decision making 
(versus other types of motivations or preferences) can we utilize self-report measures 
of impulsiveness and elicited discount rates to analyze behavior and, if necessary, 
develop welfare improving policies or practices. As such, further research on the 
methods that social scientists use to measure impulsiveness and impatience is required 
to assure that the proper tools are used to assess impulsiveness. Further, we need 
evidence that allows us to directly apply these measures to behavior. That is, if an 
individual reports that they always save for the future (a self-report measure of 
impulsiveness), but are identified as having a high discount rate (an economic 
measure of impatience), it is hard to argue that the discount rate is appropriate for 
analyzing the individual’s savings behavior.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed investigation of two different 
measures of preferences over intertemporal decision making. Specifically, we 
compare an incentive compatible measure of an individual’s intertemporal discount 
                                                 
3Karp (2005) agues that consumers’ impatience affects patterns of global warming.
rate with a self-report measure of trait impulsiveness (the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
BIS-11, Patton et al., 1995). These measures of impatience and impulsiveness have 
been used to gauge poverty and redistributive programs (e.g. Harrison et al., 2005; 
Eckel et al., 2002), assess the effectiveness of drug interventions (e.g. Hollander et al., 
2005), and identify individuals at who are likely to relapse into the consumption of 
addictive substances, engage in risky behaviors (e.g. drug use, drunk driving), and 
suffer from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorders (Doran et al., 2004; Stanford et 
al., 1996; Fossati et al., 2002). Our interest here is to identify the extent to which these 
measures identify a common behavioral trait. To the extent that they do, both 
measures gain credibility as tools to help us identify individual characteristics and 
potentially paths towards diagnostic and policy ends. That is, if the self-report 
measure is aligned with the elicitied discount rate, we have evidence that the discount 
rate is associated with trait impulsiveness. As such, both of these instruments are 
measuring the same phenomenon, and further, each one can be more broadly applied 
to individual behavior.  
Moreover, given recent research on the relationship between intertemporal 
decision making and affective state (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein and 
O'Donoghue, 2004; Read and vanLeeuwen, 1998), we compare BIS-11 measures to 
discount rates elicited under different feedback treatments. That is, apart from merely 
comparing the two measures in a neutral setting, we are able to identify the feedback 
conditions (which can be associated with affective states) under which the self-report 
measure of trait impulsivity and the elicited discount rate are most closely aligned.  
While both of these measures are aimed at identifying preferences over 
intertemporal choice, we find that there is little correlation between them. The 
aggregate score and the subscales from the BIS-11 are surprisingly uncorrelated with 
the elicited discount rate. Even the individual items of the BIS-11, which would be 
expected to be directly related to the discount rate (e.g. statements regarding savings 
and current versus future consumption), are vastly independent of our discount rate 
measure. Notably, the only significant correlation between the BIS-11 measures and 
discount rates is in the special case where the discount rate was elicited after 
individuals were primed with negative feedback. That is, our data suggests that the 
behavioral characteristic characterized by the BIS-11 is only isolating the type of 
intertemporal decision making exhibited in a “negative feedback” economic 
environment. More importantly, this calls into question the appropriateness of using 
these measures in order to identify common determinants of behavior.  
2  Related Literature 
Intertemporal discounting refers to the manner in which individuals trade-off future 
and present costs and benefits, with the value of future costs and benefits being lower 
than that of identical, but more temporally proximate, costs and benefits.4 In the 
economics literature, experiments in intertemporal choice utilize a well-known 
procedure for eliciting discount rates: Participants are presented with choices between 
an amount of money x  in the immediate future and a larger amount x y+  in the more 
distant future. An individual’s discount rate is approximated based on the value of y  
such that the individual is indifferent between the two options. Methodologically, the 
advantage of such an elicitation technique is that participants’ choices are incentive 
compatible: Participants are making choices resulting real in payoffs of x  or x y+ , 
each of which is implemented with some known probability. Such techniques have 
been successfully used by Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison et al. (2002) and 
Wilson and Daly (2003). These studies demonstrate that nominal discount rates can 
be assumed to be constant within a household but differ with respect to demographic 
variables (Harrison et al., 2002). Specifically, discount rates appear to decline with 
age and women have lower discount rates than men (Coller and Williams, 1999; 
Wilson and Daly, 2003).  
Trait-impulsivity is characterized by behaviors reflecting a preference for 
immediate rewards and significant difficulty in resisting such rewards (Mitchell, 
1999; Monterosso and Ainslie, 1999). A frequently used self-report measure of 
impulsivity is the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) consisting of 30 statements of 
personal characteristics (presented in appendix A). Respondents are asked to indicate 
the extent to which the statements apply to them using a four-point scale ranging from 
rarely/never to always/almost always. The raw impulsiveness measure is the sum of 
the scores of these responses (the larger the sum, the more impulsive is the 
participant). The scale can be decomposed into three subscales measuring specific 
aspects of impulsivity: motor impulsiveness, nonplanning impulsiveness and 
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attentional impulsiveness.5 The BIS-11 has been used with a variety of populations 
(e.g. Crean et al., 2000; Kirby et al.,1999; Mitchell, 1999; Stanford et al., 1996) and 
has demonstrated reliability and validity (Carrillo-de-la-Pe~na et al., 1993; Fossati et 
al., 2002; Patton et al., 1995). 
Our interest is in the relationship between the measure of impatience 
characterized by the discount rate and the measure of impulsiveness obtained from the 
BIS-11, with special attention to the implications this has for the applicability of these 
measures. While past studies have focused on aggregate correlations between self-
report questionnaires and practical measures of impatience, these studies have utilized 
subject pools consisting of individuals with self-control issues (e.g. drug addicts, 
problem drinkers, psychiatric outpatients). For example, Coffey et al. (2003) 
 compared self-reported measures of impulsivity to the traditional economic discount 
rate among individuals with cocaine dependencies. While these measures should 
characterize similar aspects of an individual’s intertemporal decision-making, 
correlations were insignificant. Similarly, Kirby et al. (1999) compared heroin 
addicts’ responses to the BIS-10 with discount rates elicited from choices between 
immediate and delayed monetary rewards. While no aggregate correlation between 
the BIS-10 measure and the discount rate was identified, both nonplanning 
impulsiveness and cognitive impulsiveness were significantly correlated with the 
discount rate. This correlation between the discount rate and two subscales of the BIS-
10 (albeit with a very specific participant pool) begin to suggest that the two measures 
may be only tangentially related.6  
3  Method 
Our experiment focused on the elicitation of discount rates from 83 participants 
recruited from the undergraduate student population at our university. Each 
participant returned every two weeks, participating in a maximum of four sessions 
thereby permitting multiple observations of participants’ discount rates and self-
                                                 
5Attentional impulsiveness is related to cognitive impulsiveness present in previous incarnations of the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. 
6The lack of correlation between psychological measures of impatience and discount rates is not 
specific to the BIS-11. For example, while Madden et al. (1997) and Richards et al. (1999) (using 
opioid addicts and problem drinkers) find some correlation between a self-reported measure of 
impatience (the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire) and elicited discount rates, Crean et al. (2000) and 
Vuchinich and Simpson (1998) (using psychiatric outpatients and problem drinkers) find no correlation 
between this measure of impulsivity and discount rates. 
reported measures. With attrition over the seven-week period, this yielded 259 
observations of elicited discount rates and self-reported measures.  
In each experimental session, participants were asked to complete the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, presented in appendix A). Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which each statement applied to them using a four-point scale 
ranging from rarely/never to always/almost always. We utilized the BIS-11 given 
previous evidence that this measure is a better predictor of impulsiveness across a 
variety of respondent populations (e.g. Carrillo-de-la-Pe~na et al., 1993; Mitchell, 
1999; Stanford et al., 1996)7.  
After completing the BIS-11, individuals participated in an unrelated 
bargaining game (see appendix B) after which discount rates were elicited. The results 
of the bargaining were used to introduce a feedback manipulation: While all subjects 
participated in the bargaining game, only a randomly assigned group learned the 
outcome of the game (i.e. their payoffs) prior to the elicitation of discount rates (cf. 
Charness and Levin, forthcoming, among others). This provided a measure of the 
effect of feedback (yielding changes in affect or mood) on elicited discount rates.8 
Given that many of the studies utilizing the BIS-11 have used participants pools 
consisting of addicts or individuals suffering mood disorders, we wished to explore 
the extent to which the BIS-11 perhaps coincided better with intertemporal decisions 
undertaken in “non-neutral” emotional states.  
In the elicitation of discount rates, participants indicated their preference 
between $40 in two weeks and $40+  in five weeks (see Figure 1). Discount rates 
were approximated by the point at which participants ceased choosing the first 
payment option and began choosing the second payment option (as in Coller and 
Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002, 2005). Options were delineated by three-week 
interest rates ranging from 2% to 30% in 2.5% increments.
y
9  
Participants were aware that they were making decisions resulting in real 
payoffs with some probability: In each session there was a 10% probability that a 
participant would receive her chosen options from Figure 1. Participants were 
                                                 
7In the context of this paper, impulsivity is defined as having a strong preference for sooner rewards. 
8Capra (2004) finds that individuals experiencing good mood are more altruistic and helpful in 
experimental games. Similarly, Charness and Levin (forthcoming) find evidence of “emotional 
reinforcement” influencing deviations from Bayesian updating. One might expect discount rates 
elicited in an economic experiment to vary with mood just as they may in the presence of heightened 
levels of hunger, pain or other visceral factors (Loewenstein, 1996).
informed of their payoff at the end of the next session and (if chosen) received the 
payment at the specified date (i.e. two weeks or five weeks after the session). For the 
last of the four sessions, participants were informed of their payoff from Figure 1 by 
email and told after which date they could receive payment.10  
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
4. Results 
Our data includes 259 observations across four treatments. In the control treatment 97 
observations involved no feedback on the outcome of the bargaining game between 
the answering the BIS-11 and the elicitation of the discount rate. In the three other 
treatments, participants learned the outcome of the bargaining game after answering 
the BIS-11 but prior to the elicitation of discount rates. As such, the outcome of the 
bargaining game (or the mood engendered by knowing this outcome) may have 
affected the elicited discount rate. In the positive feedback treatment 61 participants 
learned they had received a payoff strictly greater than $5 in the bargaining game.11 In 
the negative feedback treatment 52 participants learned they had received a payoff 
strictly less than $5 in the bargaining game. Finally, in the neutral treatment 49 
participants learned they had received a payoff of exactly $5 from the bargaining 
game. Our attention to these treatments is to identify any ways in which the BIS-11 
correlates with discount rates elicited under altered states of affect or mood. Note that 
feedback is only salient for the elicitation of the discount rate; the BIS-11 was always 
completed prior to feedback being received.  
To begin, we investigated the reliability of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient calculated from our data is 0.845, evidence that 
responses on the scale are consistent across the 30 items (cf. Fossati et al., 2002; 
Patton et al., 1995, in which Cronbach Alpha coeffcients range from 0.79 
                                                                                                                                            
9One exception is the first increment of 3.0%. 
10The experiments were conducted over computers and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). 
11We chose $5 as the cutoff for the feedback treatments as it was the median monetary payoff in each 
of the bargaining games. 
to 0.83 with different subject pools).12 Summary statistics from the Barratt scores and 
(three-week) discount rates are reported in Table 1. We find no differences in discount 
rates (in the control or positive affect treatments) or self-reported measures across 
genders (cf. Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Patton et al., 1995; 
Stanford et al., 1996). 
  
Table 1 about here. 
 
Turning our attention to the relationship between the BIS-11 and elicited 
discount rates, we consider three comparisons of BIS-11 responses and discount rates 
elicited under the control, positive feedback, and negative feedback treatments.13 First 
we consider the aggregate impulsiveness score calculated by summing an individual’s 
responses to the 30 items of the BIS-11. Using both Spearman Rank and Kendall 
Rank correlations on data from the control treatment, we are unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the discount rate and the aggregate BIS-11 measure are independent 
(  and ). Indeed, the Spearman Rank correlation coefficient 
between the elicited discount rate and the aggregate BIS-11 measure is negative, 
 (see Table 1). Similar results hold for the correlation between the discount 
rate elicited after positive feedback. It is only with respect to discount rates elicited 
after negative feedback that we are able to reject the hypothesis that the discount rate 
that the aggregate BIS-11 measure are independent. Moreover, it is only under these 
conditions that we observe a positive correlation between these two measures of 
impatience. Thus, taken at the aggregate level, it appears that it is only when primed 
with negative feedback that elicited discount rates and the BIS-11 provide measures 
of the same behavioral characteristic.
0 7263p = . 0 8496p = .
0 0360− .
14  
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
                                                 
12We also calculated Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the BIS-11 for each session separately, finding 
values ranging from 0.838 to 0.868. 
13For simplicity and exposition, the neutral feedback treatment is not analyzed here. In terms of results, 
the correlation of the neutral treatment to responses from the BIS-11 mirrors that of the control 
treatment. Intuitively, it is not clear what type of “mood” this feedback generates. The inclusion of $5 
as a potential outcome in the bargaining games highlighted the positive or negative feedback associated 
with getting a higher or lower payoff than one’s bargaining partners. 
14Among smokers, Doran et al. (2004) find no association between trait-impulsiveness and post-quit 
changes in affect.
To gain greater insight into the relationship between these two measures, we 
decompose the BIS-11 into the nonplanning impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness and 
attentional impulsiveness subscales. The Spearman Rank correlation coefficients 
between the subscales and the discount rate elicited in the control, positive feedback, 
and negative feedback treatments are reported in Table 2. The results are similar to 
those obtained from the analysis of the aggregate BIS-11 score: With respect to the 
control and positive feedback conditions, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that 
elicited discount rates and the scores on each subscale are independent. Moreover, 
while positive correlations are expected, many of the correlations are negative. 
However, we can reject the independence hypothesis with respect to discount rates 
elicited under the negative feedback condition, and even then only with respect to the 
motor impulsiveness subscale. Overall, this suggests that there is no relationship 
between the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and the economic discount rate except in the 
special case where discount rates were measured after priming with negative 
feedback. Even then, the discount rate is only significantly correlated with a single 
subscale.  
Finally, we consider the relationship between elicited discount rates and the 
individual items of the BIS-11. As there exists a possibility that discount rates may be 
correlated with one specific item in the scale, we measure the direct relationship 
between the discount rate and each BIS-11 item, calculating a Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between the discount rate and each item (Table 3). As in the 
above analysis, no strong pattern emerges except in the case of the negative feedback 
treatment. That is, discount rates elicited after individuals were primed with negative 
feedback are correlated with a higher number of Barratt items than those in either the 
control or positive feedback treatments. Also note that all the significant correlations 
between the discount rate in the control or positive feedback treatments and the 
Barratt items are negative. With respect to the significant correlations between the 
discount rates in the negative feedback treatment and the Barratt items, the majority 
are positive.  
 
Table 3 about here. 
5  Discussion 
It is interesting to note which of the items on the BIS-11 correlate with the discount 
rates elicited after negative feedback. In particular, the items “I buy things on 
impulse” (item 8), “I spend or charge more than I earn” (item 11) and “I do not save 
regularly” (item 21, reverse scoring) are positively and significantly correlated with 
elicited discount rates. This is striking as each of these items address economists’ 
conception of impatience and fit well with decisions that are functions of the discount 
rate (i.e. consumption and savings).  
The items “I act on the spur of the moment” (item 7) and “I say things without 
thinking” (item 18) are similarly correlated but are more focused on impulsive 
behavior. These items indicate an interesting parallel between the concept of 
impatience captured in the discount rate and psychologists’ concept of impulsiveness. 
Finally, the items “I do not like to think about complex problems” (item 19, reverse 
scoring) and “I get easily bored when solving thought problems” (item 23) may be 
tied to the idea of bounded rationality (e.g. limited cognitive resources, limited 
attentional facilities; see Conlisk,1996). This suggests that greater impatience (or the 
lack thereof) may be linked to the degree of normative rationality individuals display.  
Taken together, these statements of impatience and impulsiveness demonstrate 
a connectedness between the discount rate and trait impulsiveness, particularly in 
negative feedback states. This may be valuable in shedding greater insight and 
developing policy prescriptions regarding the high daily discount rates observed by 
Shapiro (2005). Among those individuals receiving assistance (i.e. food stamps), daily 
discount rates are manifest in a 10% to 15% decline in caloric intake over the food 
stamp month. This implies a dramatically high rate of impatience within this 
population, many of whom are living in poverty and may be experiencing states of 
negative affect or symptoms of depression (Brown, 2002; McLeod and Shanahan, 
1993). In such circumstances, psychological measures such as the BIS-11 may 
complement the elicitation of discount rates and offer policy prescriptions based on 
behavioral approaches to poverty.  
Overall, we find that the composite measure of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale, the Barratt subscales, and a large number of the individual items on the Barratt 
scale are only significantly correlated with the economic discount rates elicited after 
participants were primed with negative feedback. This is a signal that the Barratt 
Scale may be more effective in predicting the discount rates of those in negative 
affective states. As discussed above, much of the research conducted on the 
relationship between elicited discount rates and self-reported measures of impulsivity 
has been conducted with subjects whose affective state may be considered non-neutral 
(e.g. heroin and cocaine addicts, psychiatric outpatients). Given our results, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that scales such as the BIS-11 have been frequently utilized in 
the analysis of such subject pools. As discussed by Elster (1999), the effects of 
cognitive antecedents to discount rate elicitation in our experiments may parallel the 
effects of the antecedents facing individuals with addiction issues.  
However, when considering more general populations, it appears that these 
measures of impatience are uncorrelated. Therefore, because we are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that the BIS-11 and elicited discount rates are predominantly 
independent, we are lacking the evidence that allows us to relate one or both of these 
measures to more broad behavior. Further research is needed in order to identify 
which of these measures (if any) are able to be used in this manner.  
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the Barratt Scale and 
the economic discount rate is the lack of incentive compatibility in the elicitation of 
responses to the BIS-11 (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Most importantly, without 
incentives for participants to answer truthfully to each item of the BIS-11, participants 
may be less precise about their response whereas elicited discount rates are incentive 
compatible in that participants (with some probability) receive their chosen payoff. 
This incentive compatibility assures that participants exert a reasonable amount of 
diligence to align their selections with their preferences. That said, one would expect 
the effect of incentives (or the lack thereof) to be uniform across treatments, yielding 
no correlation between the BIS-11 measures and discount rates in each treatment (i.e. 
the randomness in responses to the BIS-11 items should be uniform across feedback 
conditions). The fact that we find correlations with respect to discount rates elicited 
after negative feedback is an indication that the absence of explicit incentives (for the 
BIS-11 responses) does not fully explain our results.  
6  Conclusion 
To the extent that scores on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and discount rates are 
both directed at measuring intertemporal preferences, one would expect to identify a 
strong correlation between each measure. However, our analysis finds only 
insignificant correlations between the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (with respect to the 
aggregate measure, the subscales, and individual items) and elicited discount rates. It 
appears that only when participants are primed with negative feedback does the 
Barratt scale predict individuals’ discount rates. Thus, our results imply that, in 
anything other than a negative feedback environment, one or both of these measures 
lacks practical predictive power and likely measures something other than 
impulsivity. This result raises concerns about reliance on these measures when 
looking at the determinants of behavior.  
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A  Barratt Scale: BIS-11 
Below are the 30 personal statements of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale as listed in 
Patton et al. (1995). Each is rated on a 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (always/almost always) 
scale. The scoring on items 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 26 is reversed (4 
(rarely/never) to 1 (always/almost always)).  
1. I “squirm" at plays or lectures.  
2. I am restless at the theater or lectures.  
3. I don’t “pay attention."  
4. I concentrate easily.  
5. I am a steady thinker.  
6. I act “on impulse."  
7. I act on the spur of the moment.  
8. I buy things on impulse.  
9. I make up my mind quickly.  
10. I do things without thinking.  
11. I spend or charge more than I earn.  
12. I am happy-go-lucky.  
13. I am a careful thinker.  
14. I plan tasks carefully.  
15. I am self-controlled.  
16. I plan trips well ahead of time.  
17. I plan for job security.  
18. I say things without thinking.  
19. I like to think about complex problems.  
20. I like puzzles.  
21. I save regularly.  
22. I am more interested in the present than the future.  
23. I get easily bored when solving thought problems.  
24. I change residences.  
25. I change jobs.  
26. I am future oriented.  
27. I can only think about one problem at a time.  
28. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.  
29. I have “racing" thoughts.  
30. I change hobbies.  
B  Description of Games 
The following are descriptions of the games played in each session. The results of 
these games are consistent with results in the existing literature (see Camerer, 2003).  
 
 1.   Week One: Discrete-Choice Dictator Game  
Participants were randomly matched into anonymous groups of two. Each participant 
was given the choice between three payoff options: (a) $9 for self, $0 for other person 
(b) $5 for self, $5 for other person (c) $6 for self, $2 for other person. The computer 
then randomly chose and implemented one of the partners’ choices for each pairing. 
The distribution of chosen offers is presented below. The deviations from pure self-
interested behavior are consistent with other, similar games.  
 
Option Payoffs Frequency 
A  (9,0)  35.7%   
B  (5,5)  48.8%   
C  (6,2)  15.5%   
 
 2.   Week Two: Redistribution Game  
Participants were randomly matched into anonymous groups of four. Each participant 
was allocated $10, and had the option of redistributing their money to a public fund 
paying each person in the group 0 25.  times the sum of all contributions within the 
group. That is, an individual’s payoff was 10$ − their contribution +   times the 
sum of all contributions within the group. Participants’ choices were made 
simultaneously. Consistent with various linear public good games, the average 
contribution (standard deviation) was 1.22 (1.86).  
0 25.
 
3.   Week Three: Discrete-Choice Dictator Game  
Participants were randomly matched into anonymous groups of two. Each participant 
was given the choice between three payoff options: (a) $10 for self, $0 for other 
person (b) $5 for self, $5 for other person (c) $6 for self, $2 for other person. The 
computer then randomly chose and implemented one of the partners’ choices for each 
pairing. The distribution of chosen offers is presented below. The deviations from 
pure self-interested behavior are consistent with similar games.  
 
Option Payoffs Frequency  
A  (10,0) 79.4%   
B  (5,5)  15.9%   
C  (6,2)  4.8%   
 
 
4.   Week Four: Stylized Ultimatum Game  
Participants were randomly matched into anonymous groups of two and randomly 
assigned the roles of proposer and responder. The proposer was given $10 and chose 
how much of this endowment she was to share with the responder. At the same time, 
the responder indicated the minimum offer she would accept from the proposer (cf. 
Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Oxoby and McLeish, 2004). If the offer was greater than 
or equal to the minimum acceptable offer, each player received the amount agreed 
upon. However, if the actual offer was less than the minimum acceptable offer, both 
players received nothing. The average (standard deviation) offer was 4.84 (1.23). The 
average (standard deviation) minimum acceptable offer was 3.36 (2.19). This is 
consistent with similar ultimatum games.  
Table A: 
 
Payoff 
Alternative 
Payment 
Option A (pays 
amount below 
in 2 weeks) 
Payment 
Option B (pays 
amount below 
in 5 weeks) 
Payment Preferred (circle A or 
B) 
1 $40 $40.80 A B 
2 $40 $42 A B 
3 $40 $43 A B 
4 $40 $44 A B 
5 $40 $45 A B 
6 $40 $46 A B 
7 $40 $47 A B 
8 $40 $48 A B 
9 $40 $49 A B 
10 $40 $50 A B 
11 $40 $51 A B 
12 $40 $52 A B 
 
  
Figure 1. Table A used in the experiment. 
 
 Barratt 
Score  
Discount 
Rate  
Discount 
Rate  
Discount 
Rate   
 All 
Treatments
Control 
Treatment 
Positive 
Feedback 
Negative 
Feedback 
All 
Observations
62.749 
(10.368)  
13.773 
(8.136)  
14.393 
(8.703)  
13.529 
(8.155)   
Males  61.923 
(10.007)  
12.198 
(8.245)  
14.875 
(7.732)  
11.897 
(7.543)   
Females  63.981 
(10.816)  
15.670 
(7.670)  
13.700 
(10.065) 
16.611 
(8.584)   
 
Table 1. Summary of Means (Standard Deviations) for the BIS-11 Score and the Economic 
Discount Rate. 
 
 
 Control Treatment  Positive Feedback  Negative Feedback  
 Test of : 
Indep. 
0H Test of : 
Indep. t 
0H Test of : 
Indep. 
0H
 
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. Coef. ( ) prob t>| |
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. Coef. ( )prob t>| |
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. Coef. ( )prob t>| |
Agg.  -0.0360 0.7263 -0.1021 0.4336 0.2988 0.0314 
NI  -0.0318 0.7570 -0.0500 0.7020 0.1839 0.1918 
MI  0.0139 0.8922 0.0234 0.8581 0.3515 0.0106 
AI  -0.1623 0.1123 -0.1838 0.1563 -0.0044 0.9753 
 
Table 2. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between Discount Rates and the 
Aggregate BIS-11 Score (Agg.) and BIS-11 Subscales: Nonplanning Impulsiveness (NI), Motor 
Impulsiveness (MI), and Attentional Impulsiveness (AI).
 
 
 Control Treatment  Positive Feedback  Negative Feedback   
 Test of : 
Indep. 
0H Test of : 
Indep. t 
0H Test of : 
Indep. 
0H
 
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. 
Coef. 
( )prob t>| |
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. Coef. ( )prob t>| |
Spearman 
Rank 
Corr. Coef. ( )prob t>| |
ARate    
Item 1  -0.0616 0.5486 -0.1274 0.3279 -0.2795 0.0448 
Item 2  -0.0613 0.5509 0.0186 0.8871 -0.0983 0.4882 
Item 3  -0.0701 0.4950 -0.0640 0.6243 0.1262 0.3726 
Item 4  -0.1377 0.1787 -0.2138 0.0980 0.1432 0.3112 
Item 5  -0.1109 0.2797 -0.2710 0.0346 0.1374 0.3312 
Item 6  -0.0170 0.8688 0.1517 0.2433 0.1961 0.1635 
Item 7  0.0028 0.9783 0.1656 0.2020 0.4537 0.0007 
Item 8  0.1002 0.3289 -0.0013 0.9919 0.3946 0.0038 
Item 9  -0.1536 0.1331 0.0003 0.9980 0.1617 0.2520 
Item 10  -0.1832 0.0725 -0.1713 0.1868 0.0419 0.7682 
Item 11  -0.0721 0.4829 0.1312 0.3135 0.2955 0.0334 
Item 12  0.0768 0.4549 0.1592 0.2204 0.0579 0.6836 
Item 13  -0.0838 0.4147 -0.1805 0.1640 0.0623 0.6606 
Item 14  -0.0845 0.4106 -0.1254 0.3356 -0.1248 0.3781 
Item 15  -0.1456 0.1547 -0.0820 0.5300 0.0557 0.6951 
Item 16  -0.1598 0.1180 0.0245 0.8513 -0.0130 0.9274 
Item 17  -0.0931 0.3643 -0.1493 0.2507 -0.3278 0.0177 
Item 18  -0.1678 0.1003 -0.0814 0.5329 0.2479 0.0765 
Item 19  0.0013 0.9902 0.0295 0.8214 0.3923 0.0040 
Item 20  0.1173 0.2525 0.0460 0.7250 0.1484 0.2936 
Item 21  0.0199 0.8464 0.1433 0.2705 0.3130 0.0239 
Item 22  0.1287 0.2091 -0.0616 0.6372 -0.0795 0.5755 
Item 23  0.0808 0.4312 -0.1177 0.3663 0.5185 0.0001 
Item 24  0.1367 0.1819 0.1430 0.2714 0.0843 0.5526 
Item 25  0.1088 0.2886 0.0140 0.9149 0.2016 0.1519 
Item 26  0.0434 0.6731 -0.2168 0.0932 0.0150 0.9159 
Item 27  0.0793 0.4400 -0.1698 0.1909 0.0144 0.9194 
Item 28  -0.0534 0.6031 -0.1633 0.2086 0.1371 0.3323 
Item 29  -0.0651 0.5266 -0.0422 0.7465 -0.0796 0.5750 
Item 30  -0.1362 0.1834 -0.0494 0.7056 -0.0083 0.9534 
 
Table 3. Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients Between Discount Rates  
and BIS-11 Items. 
